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Abstract
Public sector IT projects have to contend with challenges that go beyond socio-technological
hindrances, and which relate to issues regarding bureaucracy, efficiency and budgeting as well. This
complexity is compounded when situated in a healthcare context, given the known challenges of
appropriate use of IT in this area. This paper employs Swanson and Ramiller’s (1997) concept of
organizing visions to investigate the discourse surrounding electronic health records in England. We
illustrate how the organising vision of electronic health records was apparent in England’s National
Programme for IT (NPfIT), highlighting its shifting priorities and the variations across the stakeholder
groups involved in the project. Recognising the presence of conflicting as well as converging dynamics
between these actors, we build on research which has discussed the differences between collective
groups such as clinicians, IT developers and managers. We discuss the shifting roles of community
groups specific to the NPfIT organizing vision and draw from literature on professional hybridization
to illustrate the existing overlap between clinicians and IT professionals, a hybrid form which has seen
limited research to date.
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1

Introduction

New and innovative information and communication technologies (ICT) would at first
glance appear to be an unconventional area of interest to the public sector given its
general aversion to risk (Ahmad and Broussine, 2003). In the case of health
technologies such as electronic health records (EHRs), the challenges of IT
implementations (Goldfinch, 2007) combined with the complexity of the healthcare
sector (Goldschmidt, 2005) are exemplified when transferred to public sector settings
which have their own set of challenges (Jones, 2008; Ahmad and Broussine, 2003).
Despite this, the transformational capabilities of technology have been recognised and
governments have seen renewed efforts to incorporate IT for better delivery of
services to the public (Silcock, 2001; DH, 2002).

Scholars have devoted much effort into investigating the nuances of EHR
implementations at various levels including national level projects (Atkinson et al.,
2002; Ilie et al., 2009; Robertson et al., 2010). The presence of numerous stakeholder
groups in health IT projects, each having very different needs and attitudes
(Herzlinger, 2006), suggests a high level of interdependencies between these groups.
This paper focuses on some of these dynamics, and illustrates how these come into
play in a public sector IT setting which has the added dimension of political influence
and government control.

A number of approaches such as actor-network theory, technological frames and
structuration theory have been employed to investigate technology use and the role of
user groups in implementation and usage of these technologies (Doolin and Lowe,
2002; Davidson, 2006). The actor role in actor-network theory is granted some form
of action or control (Doolin and Lowe, 2002) which was not always evident in the
particular IT setting this paper investigates. Many of the leadership roles in the project
we look at, had limited powers in practice, as we shall soon see. The incongruence of
technological frames in an inter-organisational setting due to the diverse stakeholder
groups involved (Davidson, 2006) points to a need for investigating the dynamics
between community groups, and this is offered by the discourse based approach
around which the concept of organizing visions (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997) is
centred. This approach not only allows us to discuss interactions between community

stakeholder groups and their influence in steering the way technology is adopted, but
it also allows us to study the overarching discourses relevant to the vision, in this case
being the national implementation of EHRs. We draw on Swanson and Ramiller’s
(1997) work, recognising the evolutionary nature of discourses surrounding new
technologies, subject to the inputs of community stakeholders. These community
groups are to be distinguished from communities of practice whose main purpose is
the sharing of knowledge amongst group members (Wenger and Snyder, 2000). In
this paper the emphasis is on the inputs, discourses and interactions of community
groups with regard to a specific initiative, rather than intra-community discourse. We
extend Swanson and Ramiller’s (1997) framework to a specific public sector IT
initiative, namely England’s National Programme for IT (NPfIT), discussing how it
may be regarded as a vehicle for the organising vision of EHRs in England during the
time of its operation.

Studies indicate polarities between some stakeholder groups such as clinicians and
managers, and amongst different clinical groups (Marshall, 1998; Robinson et al.,
1994; Hunter, 1992). However, there is also an increasing phenomenon of gradual
convergence between some of these generally opposing groups in certain instances.
We draw on literature on professional boundaries and hybrids (Ferlie et al. 2011;
2012) to gain insights, and suggest the emergence of another hybrid professional as a
consequence of primary care doctors’ interest and involvement in IT development.

This paper seeks to identify some of the conflicts amongst community stakeholders
such as physicians, nurses, industry experts and the government, in the context of the
NPfIT. We explore shifting priorities and discourses in the evolution of the organising
vision, and investigate how dominant community groups can cloud the original vision
and manipulate the path it takes. The paper also highlights the dissolving boundaries
between specific community groups, and the implications held for professionals and
hybrid roles in the community.

We first provide a brief overview on the challenges of public sector IT initiatives and
health technologies. This will be followed by a discussion on organising visions and
why the NPfIT may be regarded as an organising vision in itself. We also discuss the
presence and influence of multiple stakeholders in an organising vision, and recent

research on the increasing overlap between various specific professions, a
phenomenon termed as professional hybridization. We will then provide an overview
of our research methods, followed by our findings, discussion and conclusion.

2. Health technologies and public sector ICT
Technology acts as a double-edged sword in healthcare, capable of providing benefits
including improved connectivity, access to reliable information, reduced medical
errors, and reduced costs (Bates et al., 2003; Goldschmidt, 2005; Herzlinger, 2006;
Ilie et al., 2009; Atkinson et al., 2002), but also presenting impediments such as
isolated unconnected systems, system failures and poor infrastructure (Mantzana et
al., 2008). Other socio-technical challenges to successful health IT implementation
include data integrity, security, confidentiality and clinical resistance due to ingrained
practices (Goodhue et al., 1992; Alshawi et al., 2003; Atkinson et al., 2002; Hier et
al., 2005).

Hierarchies and bureaucracy may be present in many settings but are particularly
pronounced in the public sector and government projects (Jones, 2008; Ahmad and
Broussine, 2003). Public sector initiatives are extremely risk averse (Ahmad and
Broussine, 2003) and a lack of political will is one of the reasons why many national
public sector programmes fail (Jones, 2008). The other extreme is equally detrimental,
where political will mutates into a political agenda that may conflict with the needs
and demands of the public. When this occurs, the potential and aims of such
initiatives are often tinged with false assumptions, ulterior motives and ultimately,
disillusionment (Ahmad and Broussine, 2003).

Historically the UK public sector has had a focus on productivity and budgeting
measures (Jones, 2008). This holds true in the case of the NHS as well, with its
various

reforms

surrounding

purchasing

models,

performance

measures,

reorganization and emergence of new bodies, fundholding and shifting agendas
(Klein, 1995; Morrell, 2006). In the late 1990s, the need for improved service delivery
resulted in calls for modernization, and this included the incorporation of information
systems to facilitate this aim (Jones, 2008; NHS, 2000; The NHS Confederation,
2003).

In general, IT development projects have an extremely high failure rate (Brown, 2001;
Goldfinch, 2007), and when placed in a public sector setting are subject to further
challenges including publicity, political changes, the need for accountability and the
lack of technical expertise to negotiate appropriately with suppliers (Parliamentary
Office of Science and Technology, 2003; Cross, 2005). By the early 2000s, the UK
public sector experienced a number of IT project failures as highlighted in a report by
the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee (2000). These projects spanned various
departments including agriculture, health, the Inland Revenue, defence and education,
and it was acknowledged that there was a need to learn from past mistakes.

It was in this milieu that the NPfIT was conceived the year following the publication
of this report. At this time there appeared to be a shift from traditional public sector
management to new public management (NPM) (Crawford and Helm, 2009), and the
NPfIT reflected this in its attempts to engage in consultations with people rather than
limit the level of community involvement. While there was an effort to try and learn
from successful projects in other countries such as the US (Stevens, 2004), the
programme did not seem to remember lessons from previous IS project
implementations in the NHS (Maguire, 2007; Currie, 2008) that were detailed by the
Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee (2000). Several studies of the NPfIT have
investigated its challenges and underlying problems (Avison and Young, 2007;
Brennan, 2007; Hendy et al., 2005; Robertson et al., 2010). In this paper we focus on
some of the community dynamics and evolution of the vision, rather than an
evaluation of the project itself.

3 Organising visions
Swanson and Ramiller (1997:460) use the term ‘organising visions’ in the context of
new innovative technologies, and define it as “a focal community idea for the
application of information technology in organisations”.Dominant discussions or
‘buzzwords’ provide a glimpse into the community discourse steering the vision
(Swanson and Ramiller, 1997; 2003). While there are often conflicting views amongst
stakeholder groups in the heterogeneous community, they share a common platform,
in that they have a mutual understanding of what the vision represents (Swanson and

Ramiller 1997). EHRs, given their relatively new and innovative nature, the diverse
range of stakeholders (clinicians, technology workers, patients, etc.), the many ongoing debates and uncertainties surrounding them, and the increased attention and
investment they are receiving, are one of the rapidly evolving organising visions in
the area of healthcare IT (Davidson and Reardon, 2005).

The evolution of an organising vision depends on multiple factors including the
business problematic, community discourse and IS practitioner subcultures (Swanson
and Ramiller, 1997). The debates which community stakeholders engage in revolve
around a commonly recognised subject using mutually understandable language and
expressions. However, technology experts often bring their own domain specific
terms into a project (Murray, 2001), and this gives rise to jargon or ‘legitimated
vocabulary’ specific to the organising vision itself (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997).
These are to be distinguished from buzzwords which emerge and subside during the
lifetime of the organising vision, depending on what issues are prioritised at various
points of time. With this brief introduction to organising visions, we shall now discuss
the significance of community stakeholder groups who influence the path of an
organising vision.

3.1 Community groups in organising visions: The blurring boundaries
The career path of an organising vision is determined by factors such as the shifting
buzzwords, dominant discourses and the general reception of the vision by
community stakeholders (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997, 2004; Lucas et al., 2007). The
presence of diverse actors in the community implies that tensions, frictions and
disagreements may arise and/or subside during the evolution of the organizing vision
(Swanson and Ramiller, 1997), and this has parallels to incongruent technological
frames discussed by Davidson (2006).
While Swanson and Ramiller’s (1997) model depicts the way an organising vision is
shaped and influenced by diverse community groups and acknowledges the possible
frictions between them, discussion on how these groups interact with each other is
limited. Studies have demonstrated the tensions as well as complementarities between
physicians, nurses, managers, and IT professionals (Marshall, 1998; Robinson et al.,
1994; Hunter, 1992) It is also likely that some form of community learning takes

place, as actors learn by doing, by drawing from the on-going discourse and from
other stakeholders (Wang and Ramiller, 2009). From an organising vision perspective,
these inter-group dynamics are likely to have an impact on the path and career of
community organising visions.

Changing needs, expectations and demands of user groups imply shifts in their roles
and inputs in an organising vision. For example, the role of patients in healthcare is
becoming increasingly empowered, to the extent of being viewed as consumers and
partners in healthcare, rather than passive recipients of care from experts (Anderson
et al., 2003; Newman and Vidler, 2006; Herzlinger, 2006; Liang, 2007).
Despite the much discussed chasm between clinicians and managers, research has also
pointed to the trend of clinicians adopting a dual role, responsible for clinical care as
well as management (Hunter, 1992; Montgomery, 2001; Fitzgerald, 1994). Both,
resistance to imposed control as well as a genuine interest in the managerial aspect of
healthcare delivery have served as antecedents to the adoption of such dual roles.
Scholars have highlighted this increasing overlap between professional roles and
managerial roles, giving rise to concept of professional hybrids (Ferlie et al. 2011;
2012; McGivern et al., 2012). This phenomenon is particularly relevant to the public
sector where efforts to monitor performance, modernise services and encourage
collaborative working have given rise to new structures and reforms which exploit
hybrid forms to meet these aspirations (Kurunmäki and Miller, 2006; Nooredegraaf,
2007). The English NHS is a classic example having seen much reforms and
reorganisations in efforts to both monitor healthcare delivery and to place clinicians in
positions of leadership (Stevens, 2004). We shall now discuss organising visions in
the context of the NPfIT.

3.2 The NPfIT as an organising vision
While previous studies employing the concept of organising visions use it in relation
to broader themes and trends such as business process reengineering and tele-health
(Ellingsen and Monteiro, 2008; Klecun-Dabrowska and Cornford, 2002; Greenhalgh
et al., 2012), we extend the term to a specific project, England’s NPfIT. At this point
we would like to clarify that an organising vision is not synonymous with a project
vision. While it represents an interest common to a heterogeneous community, it may
trigger the creation of several projects, all attempting to implement the broader

principles and aims of the vision itself. However, in some cases a particular initiative
may dominate a setting to the extent that the organising vision is tightly intertwined
with it in that particular context.

We suggest that the NPfIT may be regarded as one such example, wherein the
organising vision of EHRs (Davidson and Reardon, 2005) in England has been
inextricably linked to the national programme from 2002 to 2011. To further
demonstrate how the NPfIT may be regarded as an organising vision in itself, we
discuss how it fulfils Swanson and Ramiller’s (1997) three functions of organising
visions: interpretation, legitimation and mobilization.

Interpretation refers to the way in which a new technology or innovation is explored
and understood in its nascent stages. This may be compared to the early efforts to
develop EHRs in the primary care sector from the 1970s to 1990s (Benson, 2002).
The usage of electronic health records clearly varied between different clinical
groups, resulting in islands of health information. This signalled a need for improved
information sharing (Burton et al., 2004), triggering the call for integrated healthcare
in England.

Legitimation questions the need for the technology, and is also influenced by the
reputation and authority of those who advocate it (Swanson and Ramiller, 1997). EHR
usage prior to the NPfIT was predominantly by GPs, many of whom had an active
role in the development of the systems (Benson, 2002; de Lusignan and Chan, 2008),
and most GP practices in England were computerised by the time the NPfIT was
launched. While the government’s drive towards modernization included aims to
increase the use of IT in healthcare (Mark, 2005), the NPfIT itself was launched
following decisions taken by policy makers behind the doors of 10 Downing Street
(Cross, 2004). The success stories of GPs who had implemented EHRs, accompanied
by the political will and support of the government, provided sufficient legitimization
to initiate a national level integrated care records project.

Mobilisation refers to the effect of the organising vision on the market (Swanson and
Ramiller, 1997). Before the launch of the NPfIT, the EHR market was characterised
by several small suppliers and independent efforts by clinicians themselves (Sugden et

al., 2006; Benson, 2002). The NPfIT changed the scene of the supplier market
however, resulting in shifts in the relationships between the NHS, suppliers and
clinicians by the establishment of local service providers (LSPs) for the five clusters
identified (Sugden et al., 2006; NHS CFH, 2005a). These also acted as threats to
existing smaller suppliers who were not a part of the NPfIT.

The national programme saw its fair share of buzzwords and legitimated vocabulary.
The transient nature of buzzwords in the career of organising visions (Swanson and
Ramiller, 2003) is evident in the way the focal idea at the start of the programme was
integration of healthcare, and how this later shifted to the idea of connected healthcare
systems with ensured interoperability (NAO, 2011). The establishment of an agency
named ‘Connecting for Health’ (NHS CFH, 2005b) to carry forward the NPfIT echoes
this thought. The project was also characterised by vocabulary specific to its
implementation, such as sealed envelopes, opt-in/opt-out, Choose and Book,
Summary Care Record (SCR), Detailed Care Record (DCR), N3 network, etc. Its
large scale and public sector setting implied the presence of numerous community
stakeholder groups including clinicians, IT suppliers, the government, the Department
of Health (DH) and patients, all having varying interests and powers.

What shaped the organising vision of the NPfIT and how did this change over time?
To answer that, it would be necessary to investigate what level of need and demand
there was for an initiative such as the national programme. Was there a clear felt need
for it, or was it as Robertson et al. (2010) inferred from one of their respondents, ‘an
expensive and problematic solution to a non-existent clinical problem’? The benefits
of an integrated care record system cannot be denied. A recurring thought voiced by
our respondents was that it was a ‘good idea’. Ideas however need more than plans,
specifications and development to be carried through to realization. The key
underlying need was informed and contextualized specifications which took into
consideration the views of the multiple stakeholder groups concerned.

We shall now proceed to a description of our methodology, before presenting our
findings.

4 Methodology
This study used a combination of documentary data sources and semi-structured
interviews for the purpose of data collection, thus employing data triangulation as
well as methodological triangulation (Mathison, 1988; Denzin, 1989). 14 pilot
interviews were conducted to gain a general awareness of clinicians’ views and
concerns regarding EHRs. This was done using opportunity sampling and snowball
sampling, allowing the sample to emerge during this phase and facilitating
respondent-driven identification of subsequent interviews (Patton, 2002; Dilley,
2000).

This informed our next stage by sensitising us to key issues which were raised by
respondents. Documentary data sources included publications by the government, the
DH and professional bodies. These provided valuable instruments to study progress
and viewpoints surrounding the NPfIT at various points of time. For the primary
interviews, in order to hear the perspectives of various community stakeholders, we
identified professional groups including the Royal College of GPs, Royal College of
Physicians, Royal College of Nurses, and the British Computer Society, which we
have classified as ‘professional bodies’ in Table 1. We also had representations from
academia, patient groups and industry. We identified 37 respondents for these
interviews. Some respondents belonged to multiple categories (for e.g., belonging to a
professional body as well as being linked to a DH role), indicative of the overlap
between these different stakeholder groups. The interviews conducted were semistructured with open ended questions and themes for discussion, allowing respondents
to talk about their experiences without being led by the interviewers (Silverman,
2006; Yin, 2009).
Category
Professional bodies (BCS, RCGP, RCN, RCP,
AOMRC)
BMA
DOH/NHS linked bodies (CFH, NHS IA, NCAB)
Policy
Industry
Academia
Patient groups
Social Entrepreneurship/Consumer information
Other health-IT projects/roles

Number of respondents
12
3
14
4
6
8
1
1
5

Table 1. Distribution of respondents

5 Findings
On the basis of reviewed literature and our findings from our interviews, we identified
the key groups involved in the NPfIT organising vision. Figure 1 depicts these
stakeholders in the heterogeneous community and how they have their own views on
EHRs. These in turn influenced their views on the need, vision and expectations in
relation to the NPfIT which acted as the vehicle for EHRs in this context. The
diagram also highlights the main lines of interaction between specific community
groups.

Initiated under the banner of integrated healthcare, the NPfIT adopted a centralised
top-down strategy, attempting to roll out the ‘one system fits all’ approach (Brennan,
2007) using “ruthless standardisation” as stated in its early strategy document (DH,
2002). Once it was realised that this was an unworkable approach, the buzzwords
changed and the focus shifted to connectivity and interoperability. The change in
government in 2010 served as a catalyst towards this, as by September 2010 the DH
announced the abandonment of the centralised approach (DH, 2010; Bruce, 2010).The
project’s political backing (Cross, 2004) was clear, as several respondents pointed out
the politically driven nature of the NPfIT. While most respondents conceded that the
idea of a national care record service was good, the approach taken was considered
unfeasible.

Figure 1. Community stakeholder groups in the NPfIT National Care Record Service organising
vision

Launched with the National Care Record Service (NCRS) being one of the core
features, later progress reports included other components portrayed as successes. One
respondent drew attention to the picture used on the cover of a report on the progress
of the NPfIT (NAO, 2006) - that of an x-ray image highlighting the success of the
Picture Archiving and Communications System (PACS). PACS was never a part of
the initial project specifications however, and this respondent regarded this as a subtle
attempt to divert attention from the initial central component of the NPfIT. Media was
evidently exploited to pervert the general awareness of the programme’s progress,
though alongside this there was a significant amount of negative media coverage as
well on the project.

With regard to the Spine itself, the NPfIT promoted it as a single national spine
intended to facilitate access to people’s records from anywhere at any time. An
unpublished report drafted by members within the NHS IA and the NCAB on behalf
of the Ministerial Taskforce on Information Technology (2003) on the other hand,
conceived the notion of a spine as an individual spine, with each patient having their
own Spine. This got submerged beneath other specifications, and respondents who
had been closely involved with the NPfIT at later stages did not seem to be even
aware of this initial conceptualisation of the Spine.
“This is a wonderful example of how things metamorphosed without anybody
realising what’s happened. The phrase ‘the spine’, was first coined by [personX].
(....) And [personX] had drawn a little diagram which said well, all sorts of these
things happen to Mrs Smith. But we need something where the key stuff is you know,
if things happen, this thing was running along in some way, and it’s holding key stuff
and so on. And [personX] said, ‘like a spine’. And so the phrase ‘the spine’ became
the short hand for this. Now, the change in interpretation that happened, and people
didn’t even realise they had changed the interpretation, and this reflects how deeply
embedded the organisational model of healthcare is. The Spine I just described in that
picture, was the spine of Mrs Smith’s healthcare (…) I used to say, no we’re not
creating a national system. We’re getting 50 million systems, one for each of us
(laughs). (…) This then went into all the stuff I was talking about, the department of
health, contracts everything else and the people writing the giant thing. And they

called it the spine. And they called it the NHS spine. It was the spine of the NHS. It
was the spine to hold the NHS together. It was like they were deaf!!” – Clinical
informatician, previously with NHS IA

It was evident that different stakeholders had very different views regarding the use of
EHRs, with concerns and needs specific to their professional group. GPs used their
records not only as a holistic record to store patients’ information, but also as a
business tool to manage their GP practices. They regarded themselves as
entrepreneurial, business-oriented and holistic by nature, and considered themselves
as their patients’ medical advocate. Their possessiveness over their patients’
information was criticised by their secondary care counterparts who objected to their
lack of collaboration in healthcare delivery. Nurses saw themselves in a more
supportive and caring role, and used EHRs to gain a better understanding of their
patients’ conditions.
“And that’s because our records, to be honest, are our business tool. If we don’t have
our records, we can’t run our practices and we can’t make money (…) And we also
have the ethos that GPs operate, that we are the patients’ medical advocates. And
therefore, we have always been the possessor of the clinical record” – GP
“General practitioners record information for themselves to see it later. So the
longitudinal record for individual practitioner use is regarded as very special, sacred,
and it must be protected. Hospital practitioners record information for others. That’s
why we write it down. So other people can read it and understand what’s wrong with
the patients (...) So we’re used to sharing information, and sharing information with
the patient. GP’s aren’t.” – Hospital doctor

While most GP practices were already using computerised records, the concept of a
longitudinal record as prescribed by the national programme may have been a source
of worry for some clinicians who regarded the EHR as a tracking mechanism which
could be potentially used to review their medical decisions at a later point:
“So that the longitudinal record also allowed a retrospective view, and although it
was never voiced in public, that was what a number of people were afraid of. That
they’d be caught out down the line, having given a less than ideal thing, you see” –
Hospital doctor/NCAB

The engagement mechanisms employed by the government varied over time. Despite
channels for clinical input through entities like the National Clinical Advisory Board
(NCAB) and the Care Records Development Board (CRDB), clinicians felt they were
being deliberately ignored, causing us to question whether these entities served more
as figureheads rather than a genuine effort to understand the needs of the clinical
community.

Though the NCAB and CRDB were gradually dissolved and replaced

by national clinical leads (NCLs), several respondents felt that these leads did not
have adequate leadership qualities to fulfil their role of engagement with their peers.
Further, while GPs on the one hand felt they were not given due attention, it is
possible that the nursing profession felt shadowed by the relative dominance of the
doctors, and were even less engaged than them. Some cynics regarded the NPfIT’s
shifting engagement tactics as a consequence of being unable to garner support from
certain user groups, and being forced to resort to other sources of support.
“All I remember is this clear feeling that ministers thought we were obstructive and
unhelpful because we weren’t saying yes. My belief is, we’d been proved to be right”
– GP
“The Department of Health operates in a very simple way. Decide, consult, defend,
implement.

In other words, involvement is simply a showcase” – Respondent,

Patient organisation
“I think the reason why there was a concentrated effort to endorse and embrace the
RCN was because the British Medical Association was really adamant that the
national programme for IT is not working, it’s not going to work, and they were quite
anti the NPfIT” – Nurse

Our findings revealed inter-group dynamics which shaped their views of the
programme and its participants. Referring to the first meeting between policy makers
and industry experts at 10 Downing Street, a GP commented:
“These two flashy senior execs said that you know, give us a few billion, and we will
computerise the NHS for you. … And these execs, these slick suits…” – GP
“The reason national records had not taken off across the world, and they haven’t
still, and they’re still struggling, in the UK, is because, they try and build the record
around what the companies can offer.” – Hospital doctor, NCAB

“They had no experience of delivering healthcare. Whereas the people who had
experience of delivering healthcare were seen as being awkward buggers…
Everything that they are now saying about what failed in the national programme, we
would have told them” – GP

This seemed evocative of a general view regarding industry consultants as highly
materialistic and opportunistic, with no regard for the actual needs of clinical users.
Consequently, suppliers and the clinical community held each other at arm’s length,
and the continued lack of engagement was a source of anger, frustration and low
morale to clinicians.
“In response to what GPs had wanted, many GPs had very precise requirements, and
a GP friend of mine said you have no idea how efficient we can be because of these
systems that have been developed in a way that really helps us. And all this new stuff
that they’re trying to impose on us would slow us down immensely. And one of the
central problems of the national programme was they did not have a sufficient
understanding of how IT literate people in the health community worked, particularly
in acute hospitals, but they assumed that nothing was going on of any consequence” –
Politician

As seen from the last quote, there was also an underestimation of clinicians’ progress
with IT despite GPs’ proven success with computerised records.

6 Discussion
Though a project where the main end-users were clinicians, the NPfIT had a clear
separation between clinicians on one side, and business and industry people on the
other, as clinicians’ experiences and requirements were generally ignored. The vision
was clouded by policymakers’ efforts to aspire to levels of health technology
implementations attained by other countries such as the US (Stevens, 2004). Suppliers
hence had a misplaced source of authority providing them specifications, as these
sources had other concerns on their agenda rather than assessing clinical needs. One
of the main problems which arose due to lack of clinical engagement was the
development of systems which were not fit for purpose, and which were a reflection
of what suppliers had to offer, rather than what clinicians actually wanted. As

discussed by Christensen et al. (2000), cheaper, simpler and innovative solutions
offered by smaller entrepreneurs were overshadowed by complex expensive ones
which benefitted the goliaths amongst the suppliers. Not only did this make the
programme appear supplier-driven, but our respondents also indicated that there were
too many in-betweens in the form of lawyers and the LSPs themselves. Consequently,
there was limited communication between the actual subcontracted companies
developing the systems, and the end-users, i.e., the clinicians.

The level of dialogue and the influence clinical advisory groups were allowed to exert
was limited, as is echoed in the sentiments of interview respondents. Surrounded by
the general tendency towards NPM (Crawford and Helm, 2009) where consultation
with users played an increasingly important role, the NPFIT seemed to conduct these
consultations more as an obligation than out of a genuine wish to listen to clinical
inputs. Logic dictates that projects learn from past failures, documented evidence
from previous projects, and the voice of experience (in this case, being the GPs who
had successfully implemented computerised systems in their practices); none of these
seemed to have been drawn upon early enough in the NPfIT, thus steering the NPfIT
organising vision onto a skewed career path. The nursing professionals seemed to
have an underlying feeling of being drowned out by the dominant voices of GPs, and
when the programme did attempt to engage with them, they attributed it to the fact
that it was only because of a lack of support from doctors. This provides an interesting
vignette of how interactions between the DH and clinicians shifted as a result of the
tense dynamics between certain groups.
GPs’ views of EHRs as their business tool, and their possessive nature of their
records, appear to be at odds with the NPfIT’s vision of an integrated national care
record. The NPfIT seemed to pose a threat to their closure of knowledge
(Noordegraaf, 2007) and may have been one of their primary reasons for dissent.
Secondary care respondents however seemed more welcoming of the national care
record service concept, and this may have been a cause for concern for GPs who were
highly protective of their business tools and data. As indicated by some of our
interviews, they saw no reason to share information which they had worked hard to
organise and store in their own computerised systems. These tensions served as

possible antecedents to several debates surrounding information sharing and access to
patients’ data.

The persuasive role of media and government publications was touched upon,
including subtle cues such as misleading images on cover reports, to assure
community groups that the organising vision was on track. Other interviewees also
acknowledged that there was much publicity surrounding the NPfIT, and no doubt the
press coverage also had an influence on the general public perception regarding the
national programme. The interplay of these diverse views and media publicity added
momentum to the level of dissent, and likely acted as triggers for rethinking the
approach adopted by the project.

The dominant and controlling role played by NPfIT management and policy makers
overpowered the potential for innovation, which is the central focus of an organising
vision. Despite the existence of clinician-led system specifications around the time the
NPfIT began, these were ignored, misinterpreted and completely misrepresented to
the extent that the very notion of the ‘Spine’ as we know it today is in reality not what
was envisioned by clinicians at the time. This could be due to manipulations by
dominating stakeholder groups and their lack of understanding of clinical needs to the
extent that they were oblivious to their misinterpretation of the specifications. The
way community members engage in discourse steers the shape and course of the OV.
It would also seem that prevalent institutionalised notions and the power of larger
profit-seeking IT suppliers overpower creative and new ideas, thus presenting a
conflict between the diffusion of innovative technologies (Christensen et al., 2000),
which is what OVs are centred around, and the views of the dominant community
members involved in the OV. This was what happened when the clinicians’
specifications for individual Spines (for each person) were overridden by the
dominating idea of a single NHS Spine.

The increasing incidence of hybridization between clinicians and managers/leaders
(Hunter, 1992; Montgomery, 2001; Fitzgerald, 1994), was evident from our findings.
The NPfIT began with a marked chasm between the project leaders and the end users,
i.e., the clinicians, giving rise to much dissent due to the lack of clinical engagement.
While there were clinical advisory boards in place, the level of influence they were

allowed to exert is questionable, as is echoed in the sentiments of interview
respondents. While GPs, acting as managers of their own practices, were a hybrid role
established even prior to the programme, the establishment of national clinical leads
(NCLs) incorporated new roles specific to the NPfIT.

In their work on organising visions, Swanson and Ramiller (1997) drew distinctions
between IS subcultures and other groups within the community. However, with the
emergence of professional hybrids (Ferlie et al., 2011; 2012), the once clear and rigid
boundaries distinguishing specific professional roles are growing increasingly blurred.
Our data also revealed traces of IS subcultures within the clinical community,
suggesting the absence of a rigid division between IS subcultures and clinical
community inputs in this context. While there was dissatisfaction voiced by clinicians
regarding the approaches taken by IT suppliers in the NPfIT, much of the knowledge
and experience which clinicians (particularly in primary care) leveraged on was a
result of their interest in IT. In investigating the prevalent discourses on which the
NPfIT was positioned, we regard IT suppliers as a separate group from the
mainstream community as proposed by Swanson and Ramiller (1997), but would
suggest that the IS subculture is one which is increasingly overlapping into the clinical
community, rather than outlining it as external to the community as depicted in their
model.

Despite the existence of these IT literate clinicians for several years, as evidenced by
the many independent GP systems which sprouted during the 1980’s and 1990’s, there
has been little research done on this form of professional hybrids, and there was a
tendency on the part of the NPfIT management to brush off the presence of these
professionals. As one of our respondents explained, there was a general notion that
clinicians were highly independent individuals not accustomed to being told what to
do, and who didn’t know what technology would be best for them. Consequently, they
were deliberately not included to a great extent in consultations, and it was expected
that they would just have to learn how to use the new imposed systems. There was a
clear underestimation, or perhaps even ignorance, of the capabilities of clinicians
despite their proven skill in both developing as well as implementing and using
computerised records in primary care.

7 Conclusion
This paper applies the concept of organising visions to the NPfIT, which served as the
carrier for the EHR organising vision in England. Normally used in the context of
broader trends and new technology innovations, we extend the usage of the term to
this public sector project, as it served as the primary platform for discussions and
implementations related to EHRs during this period. We illustrate how organising
visions in the public sector have to contend with the control imposed by governments
in addition to other community inputs.

While a detailed discussion of the entire evolution of the NPfIT vision is beyond the
scope of this paper, we touch upon some of the dominant buzzwords which emerged
and how these shifted with time. Our primary focus has been the multiple stakeholder
groups present in the heterogeneous community of the NPfIT organising vision, and
how these interacted with each other and with the project. We highlight the
controlling influence exerted by some of the stronger community stakeholder groups,
and how organising visions metamorphose from their original definitions as a
consequence of manipulations and ignorance of those involved. We discuss the varied
needs of community stakeholders who provide inputs to organising visions, and
illustrate how even amongst clinicians there are very different requirements and
concerns regarding the use of EHRs, emphasising

the challenges of translating

these multiple requirements into a single ‘one size fits all’ approach as was initially
adopted by the NPfIT.

The portrayal of GPs as entrepreneurial, business-like and possessive of their records
provides a character sketch which could explain their keen interest in proper use of
technology for the purpose of patient data entry. We highlight the presence of a hybrid
role, which though existent for a while now, has not been studied in the context of
professional hybrids: that of the GP-IT professional. We suggest that this is an area
with scope for much further research, and would provide valuable insights for future
research on the area of professional hybrids.
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